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Long run abnormal returns to acquiring firms: the form of payment 
hypothesis, bidder hostility and timing behavior 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper, we set out to investigate the anomaly of previously-recorded poor post-bid 
performance of acquirers.  In particular, we investigate the form of payments hypothesis, the 
form of bid hypothesis (hostile versus agreed) and the behavioral timing hypothesis, using a UK 
sample.  In the US, the majority of tender offers, often taken as an indicator of bid hostility, are 
cash financed, making the disaggregation of hypotheses on the effects of form of financing and 
bidder hostility problematic.  Using the UK as a “natural experiment” that allows examination of 
the effect of the form of payment separately from bidder hostility in a way not easily achievable 
in the US, we show that the form of payment hypothesis interacts with bid hostility, or 
“disciplinary bidding”, in explaining acquirer wealth effects.   
 
In line with previous research, we find support for the form of payment hypothesis (Aggrawal 
and Jaffe, 2000), but also show the combination of form of the bid and form of payment is a 
critical factor in determining post bid returns. Last, we show that both the form of payment 
chosen and the likelihood of a hostile bid are contingent upon macro-economic variables.  This 
finding in consistent with the Loughran and Ritter (2000) “behavioral timing” hypothesis and has 
implications for the use of calendar time returns in long-run performance studies.  In contrast to 
the findings of Mitchell and Stafford (2000) we also find evidence that calendar time 
performance measures are significantly worse during “hot” periods.  
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Long run abnormal returns to acquiring firms: the form of payment 
hypothesis, bidder hostility and timing behavior 
 
I. Introduction 
Despite the evidence on whether shareholders actually benefit from acquisitions in the long run, 
the level of acquisition and merger activity appeared to accelerate rather than decelerate in the 
run-up to the new millennium.  Theories put forward to explain the disappointing average post-
bid performance of bidders include the form of payment and form of bid (hostile versus agreed) 
hypotheses (Agrawal and Jaffe, 2000) and the behavioral timing hypothesis of Loughran and 
Ritter (2000). If the behavioral finance hypothesis is true, we should observe that the use of 
equity financing is likely to be correlated with valuation ratios of the bidder, and that post-bid 
returns are poorer for “glamour” acquirers than for “value” acquirers.  Furthermore, we might 
expect that bids undertaken in “hot” months when market valuations are high will be associated 
with poorer post-bid performance.  In this study, we investigate these hypotheses using a sample 
of UK bids.  Historically, the UK has been by far the most important European market for 
corporate control, partly because of the comparative ease with which hostile bids can be made in 
the UK compared to other EU countries (Mayer, 1996).  In addition, there are similarities 
between the UK and US which make the former market an interesting “out-of-sample” test for 
some of the research findings to emerge from the US.  Most intriguingly, though, there are 
institutional differences between the UK and the US that allow the form of payment hypothesis 
to be disentangled from the question of bidder hostility as, in contrast to the US position, many 
hostile bids are made when the form of payment is in equity.  Put in US terminology, “tender 
offers” can be, and frequently are, financed by equity.  US studies typically report that mergers 
are much more likely to be financed with cash than tender offers.  For example, Rau and 
Vermaelen (1998) report that only 7.5% of tender offers are financed through stock (equity) 
whilst 50.7% of mergers are stock-financed.  By contrast, in our sample covering 18 years of UK 
takeovers, 64.5% of hostile bids (similar to tender offers) are stock-financed, very close to the 
63.2% of non-hostile bids (“mergers”) financed in this way.  This suggests a “natural 
experiment” to disaggregate the two effects may be possible in the UK in a way that is not easily 
achievable in the US, as in the latter market the form of financing is highly correlated with bid 
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hostility in a way that does not occur in the UK.  The UK has no direct equivalent to the tender 
offer, so partitioning in studies of takeover returns is invariably made on the basis of “hostility”.  
Generally, US studies partition on the basis of tender offers versus mergers.  Schwert (2000) is a 
notable exception, but that study does not set out to examine long run bidder returns.  Schwert 
does not directly present evidence on equity-financed hostile bids as the focus of the research is 
upon differing definitions of hostility.  
 
There are several reasons why the UK takeover environment may favor equity financing of bids 
compared to the position in the US.  First, the UK market is dominated by institutional investors.  
The figures in Table 1 show that institutional investors held just under half the market value of 
UK equities in 1975, rising to 57.6% by 1981 and just under 60% by the end of our sample 
period.  By contrast, despite a trend towards institutional investment in the US during this period 
through the growth of mutual funds and pension funds, institutional holdings were only 36% by 
1990 rising to 41.1% by 1995.  An even more telling statistic, given that foreign investors also 
tend to be dominated by institutions, is the difference between individual (or household) investor 
shareholdings in the two markets.  During our sample period, this investor group only fell below 
50% of the US market in 1995.  By contrast, in the UK the holdings of this group were only 
21.6% in 1994, having fallen from 30.4% in 1981.  Perhaps even more crucial in explaining 
financing differences is the fact that pension, unit trust and insurance company shareholdings in 
the UK are managed by a highly concentrated group of fund managers.  Stapledon and Bates 
(2002, Table 2) show that the top twenty UK fund managers controlled 37.06% of the UK market 
by value as at the end of 1997.  The top three alone controlled just under 11%.  In practice, this 
means that the chances of a bid succeeding without the tacit approval of this fund management 
group are remote – it is likely that they will be managing equity stakes in both target and 
acquiring companies, unless these are small and illiquid stocks.    Given this tacit approval may 
have been needed in any event, the form of financing in a hostile bid may well be less of an issue.  
The relative unimportance of individual investors in the UK throughout the sample period means 
that there is less likely to be an emphasis on cash as a form of payment in acquisitions.   
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A second major difference between the UK and the US during our sample period is the flexibility 
in accounting for takeovers and mergers in the UK compared to the US.  Importantly, before the 
introduction of the UK Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) 10, which applied to financial 
statements in respect of accounting periods ending on or after 23
rd
 December 1998, British 
acquirers had been able to write off goodwill directly to reserves.  Indeed, the UK accounting 
regime in force between the 1970s and 1994 allowed the difference between the nominal value 
and fair value of equity issued to finance the bid to be used to write-off goodwill arising on the 
acquisition itself.  This historical ability to write-off goodwill has been shown to be a 
significantly positively associated with the probability of a bid being financed by equity in the 
UK (Gregory, 2000).   In addition, until FRS 7 came into being in respect of accounting periods 
beginning on or after 23
rd
 December 1994, the previous standard (Statement of Standard 
Accounting Practice, SSAP 22) allowed the acquiring firm to provide for post-acquisition re-
organisation costs.  These could also be written off to reserves created at the time of the merger. 
This has been used in a very “creative” fashion to manipulate post-bid earnings (Smith, 1992).
1
    
These arrangements stood in marked contrast to the US and the international position in general, 
but their net effect seems to have been to favor the use of equity financing in the UK relative to 
other countries. 
 
However, if we are to use the UK as an experimental arena is disaggregating the effects of form 
of payment and bid hostility, the conflicting evidence from recent UK research on acquiring 
firms warrants further investigation. Gregory (1997) uses six different benchmarks, including the 
Fama-French (1996) “three factor” model, using both the product of one plus the abnormal return 
(Kothari and Warner (1997) “buy-and-hold” returns) and the cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) procedures, together with a modified RATS approach and consistently finds significant 
negative performance.  From announcement to the 24 months post completion of the acquisition, 
these range from a significant -8.15% to a significant -18.01%.  Limmack (1991) uses three 
alternative benchmarks and finds significant returns ranging between -4.67% and -14.96% after 
24 months.  On a size-controlled basis, Kennedy and Limmack (1996) also provide evidence of 
                                                           
1
 For example, Smith offers the example of Coloroll’s acquisition of John Crowther (a bid that forms part of our 
sample) where the total goodwill write-off, taken direct to reserves (i.e. an example of “dirty surplus” accounting) 
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under-performance by UK acquirers with a significant -4.92% being reported for the period 12 to 
24 months post takeover.  Conn et al (2004) report abnormal returns of –19.78% after 36 months.  
Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) use an accumulated abnormal returns approach and find 
abnormal returns of around –15% after three years, with evidence that “glamour” acquirers 
perform less well than “value” acquirers.  In marked contrast, Franks and Harris (1989) and 
Higson and Elliott (1998) find no significant abnormal returns by UK acquirers.  Franks and 
Harris show a significant positive return of +4.5% in the 24 months following takeover when the 
CAPM is used to define abnormal returns, whilst Higson and Elliott report abnormal returns 
(computed on a holding period returns basis comparing merging firm return with an equivalent 
short position in the size decile benchmark) of -1.14% after  24 months and +0.83% after 36 
months. This raises the intriguing question as to whether or not the UK experience is different 
from that of the US, where negative abnormal returns to acquirers is now well-established 
(Agrawal et al [1992], Loughran and Vijh [1997]).  A full survey of the literature on long-run 
acquirer returns in the UK and US can be found in Agrawal and Jaffe (2000). 
 
Several possible explanations for the difference in findings between the various UK studies 
reported above.  The first is that the results simply reflect time-varying returns to acquisition.  To 
some degree, this would explain the difference between the Higson and Elliott (1998) results and 
those of Gregory (1997) and Limmack (1991).  Higson and Elliott report positive acquirer 
abnormal returns for the years 1981-1984, whereas Gregory (1997) covers the period 1984 to 
1992 inclusive, Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) 1984-1995 and Conn et al (2004) 1984-1998. 
Apart from 1989, all other years in their study (1975-1990) show negative returns.  Whilst there 
is considerable time variation in acquirer abnormal returns, it is unlikely that these explain the 
results obtained by Higson and Elliott (1998) in comparison to those presented by Limmack 
(1991), Gregory (1997) and Conn et al (2004).  
 
The second explanation is that all of the UK studies to date suffer from some form of 
measurement bias. Biases in long run abnormal returns have been documented by Kothari and 
Warner (1997), Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon et al (1999).  While it is more likely that such 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
after allowing for the restatement of the acquired assets to a “fair value” and the creation of provisions for future 
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biases would lead to an over-estimate rather than an under-estimate of abnormal returns, these 
studies show that misspecification of abnormal returns and significance tests can lead to over-
rejection of the null hypothesis even when the test is for significant negative CARs (e.g. Kothari 
and Warner, 1997, p.309). None of the studies referred to above employs the more sophisticated 
non-parametric testing methods advocated by Lyon et al (1999).  The first contribution of this 
paper is to examine whether significant biases in the estimation of long run abnormal returns or 
misspecification of test statistics provide the explanation for the differences between US and UK 
studies.  We show that when tests which control for the skewness and bias in the estimation of 
long run abnormal returns are properly carried out, using the methods prescribed in Lyon et al 
(1999), the negative performance of UK acquiring companies documented by Limmack (1991), 
Kennedy and Limmack (1996) and Gregory (1997) is confirmed by this study.  The evidence here 
shows that the magnitude of these abnormal returns may even have been under-estimated by 
some previous studies.   
 
Recently, Fama (1998) has argued that many apparent anomalies in the literature either disappear 
or become far less significant when abnormal returns are estimated in calendar, rather than event, 
time.  This seems unlikely to be an explanation for the poor performance of acquirers, as Gregory 
(1997) shows that calendar time returns are more negative than event time returns.  Furthermore, 
Conn et al (2004) report consistent results when calendar time returns are employed.  However, 
given the potential problems of cross-correlation in abnormal returns when long post event 
windows are used (Fama, 1998), we also report calendar time returns here.  We again show that 
significant negative abnormal returns accrue to acquiring firms, and show that these results are 
driven by the subset of equity-financing acquirers.   
 
A major issue that emerges from the evidence for both UK and US studies is whether the time 
dependent pattern of acquirer performance is a reflection of genuine under-performance by 
acquirers, or whether this pattern reflects a failure to take account of time-varying expectations 
on the part of investors.  This is analogous to the problem of measuring the performance of 
mutual fund managers where the returns required in equilibrium change over time.  In the same 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
restructuring costs, actually exceeded the amount paid for the company. 
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way that mean alphas can be used to measure fund manager performance, they can be used as a 
measure of abnormal returns, either in event time (Franks et al, 1991) or in calendar time 
(Loughran and Ritter, 1995).  Using both event time and calendar time alphas from the Fama-
French three-factor model as our measures of abnormal performance, we show that these central 
results are robust to specifications that control for performance conditional upon time-varying 
risk and expected return.  In addition, we report results using the calendar time abnormal return 
(CTAR) method of Mitchell and Stafford (2000). 
 
The testing of acquirer performance using Fama-French alphas in calendar time is likely to have 
low explanatory power if, as Loughran and Ritter (2000) argue, behavioral timing is a factor in 
acquisitions.  In practice, management have discretion over both the timing of the bid and the 
method of its financing.  Loughran and Ritter (op. cit.) contend that if firms exploit misvaluations 
through supply responses, as in the issuance of equity to finance acquisitions, then there will be 
time variation in portfolio abnormal returns.  This motivates our calculation of conditional and 
unconditional alphas in event time as well as calendar time.  However, a particular innovation in 
this study is that we go on to show that both form of financing and type of bid are contingent on 
macro-economic conditions, as proxied by a number of market and interest rate variables.  This is 
entirely consistent with the Loughran and Ritter hypothesis and leads us to conclude that calendar 
time regressions may not be the most powerful way of detecting abnormal performance by 
bidders.  Further, we find that returns in “hot” months appear to be more negative than returns in 
“cold” months, which is consistent with the recent finding of Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz 
(2005). 
 
We report results for cash, stock and mixed financing, and for hostile and friendly bids.  We use 
this latter classification because, as Higson and Elliott (1998) note, there is no direct analogy in 
the UK to the merger/tender offer dichotomy.  Furthermore, even for the US, Schwert (2000) 
provides evidence that hostility and tender offers are not totally correlated.  Other papers have 
studied the effects of bidder hostility and form of payment, but this is the first to examine the 
interaction between hostility and form of payment. As may be expected from prior studies, 
acquirers offering cash perform better than acquirers financing deals using equity. As in 
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Loughran and Vijh (1997), we show equity-financing acquirers have significantly negative 
abnormal returns, but by contrast UK cash-financing acquirers do not have significant positive 
abnormal returns.  Friendly acquirers exhibit significantly worse performance than hostile 
acquirers.  However, we show that the form of payment and bidder hostility interact to explain 
post-acquisition returns.  In support of the behavioral timing in line with the results reported by 
Rau and Vermaelen (1998) we show some evidence of a “value firm effect” in equity-financing 
bidder returns.  We also show that highly valued firms are more likely to finance bids using 
equity, and that the propensity to issue equity is associated with periods of relatively high market 
valuation.  Last, returns are lower following “hot” takeover periods than in “cool” periods.  
 
Section II of the paper explains the research design and hypotheses tested; Section III describes in 
detail the metrics used to calculate abnormal returns; Section IV describes the sample; Section V 
gives the results from our different tests of acquirer performance; finally, Section VI summarizes 
the paper and draws conclusions. 
 
II. Research design and hypotheses 
 
Inter alia, Agrawal and Jaffe (2000) articulate two hypotheses to explain the performance of 
acquirers post bid.  The first of these is the form of payment hypothesis, which is predicatively 
identical to either a “windows of opportunity” hypothesis or a “behavioral timing” hypothesis.  
The arguments here are that acquirers will be likely to opt for equity payment if either the firm is 
perceived to be relatively over-valued, or that equity is cheaper than any other form of financing.  
These are subtly different arguments.  The first is compatible with Shleifer and Vishny’s (2003) 
proposition 3, and suggests there will be firm level preferences for equity financing which may 
not aggregate at the market level.  The second is in keeping with section 5.2 of Shleifer and 
Vishny.. In this situation there will be aggregate market level effects, so that we would expect to 
see more equity financing occurring in periods where market valuations in general are high.  
Testing the first effect may appear to be straightforward, but requires both care and some 
assumptions.  One proxy for measuring relative  “over valuation” is to use rankings based some 
valuation ratio that has been shown to predict future stock returns.  An obvious candidate, that 
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has been used in previous US studies (e.g Rau and Vermaelen (1998)) and has been shown to be 
associated with future long-run returns in book the US and UK markets is the book to market 
ratio.
2
  However, two potential difficulties emerge with regard to this metric.  First, if market 
valuation ratios reflect the present value of future investment opportunities, then low book-to-
market stocks will have a superior set of investment opportunities to high book to market stocks, 
and as such, according to the free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986) may find themselves 
having to use equity financing if they are to successfully fund all investment opportunities.  This 
is the reasoning behind the acquisition announcement period tests in such studies as Lang, Stultz 
and Walking (1989), which find high q-ratio firms experience superior announcement period 
returns to low q firms.  Unfortunately, recent evidence that looks at the long run returns to such 
acquirers finds no evidence supportive of the free cash flow hypothesis.  A study of UK 
acquisitions by Gregory (2005) indicates that the long run returns for high q acquirers are 
generally poorer than those of low q acquirers, though the differences are only significant when 
cash flow is simultaneously controlled for.  Under such circumstances, in complete contradiction 
to the predictions of the free cash flow hypothesis, firms with higher free cash flow and lower q 
ratios exhibit better 5 year post bid returns.  For the set of UK firms at least, this suggests that q-
ratios may do a poor job of predicting the true investment opportunity set.  A second concern 
with the metric is that book-to-market ratios may reflect rational risk pricing.  Some evidence for 
this has been presented in Liew and Vassalou (2000).  Unfortunately, Gregory, Harris and 
Michou (2003) provide evidence that suggests that whilst the size effect in the UK appears to be 
associated with macro-economic risk, the book to market effect (as proxied by HML) does not 
appear to have a significant association once size and market risk factors are allowed for.  
Furthermore, at a portfolio level book-to-market related returns exhibit a perverse relationship 
with macro economic factors once the Fama-French factors are allowed for.  In other words, 
taken as a whole, the evidence for book-to-market effects in the UK seems compatible with a 
mispricing story.  Taking these two arguments together, we believe that a priori it is not 
unreasonable to use book to market as a proxy, albeit a crude one, for relative over or under 
valuation of stocks.  However, this interpretation is testable.  If there are mispricing effects, then 
we should see returns being related to an acquirer’s book to market ratio.  Furthermore, if 
                                                           
2
 For the UK evidence, see Gregory, Harris and Michou (2001). 
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acquirers seek to exploit these mispricing effects, as suggested by the behavioral timing 
hypothesis, then this relationship should be found in the equity financing group, but not in the 
cash financing group.  Following the above arguments on behavioral timing, financing choice 
and returns, we have three testable hypotheses, namely: 
 
H1a: Returns following equity-financed acquisitions will be lower than returns following cash-
financed or mixed-financed (partial equity) acquisitions; and 
H1b: Returns following cash-financed acquisitions will be higher than returns following mixed-
financed (partial equity) acquisitions. 
 
H2: Low book-to-market acquirers will be more likely to finance bids with equity. 
 
H3: Low book-to-market acquirers that use equity financing will exhibit lower post bid returns 
than high book-to-market acquirers using equity financing. 
 
The second set of hypotheses we wish to test relate to the form of the bid.  The argument here is 
that hostile bids are more likely to result in bidder firm shareholder wealth gains than agreed 
bids, either because of the disciplinary nature of hostile bids, or because the danger of over-
payment in order to ensure target management’s approval is mitigated.   For example, Shleifer 
and Vishny (2003) highlight this as a possible explanatory factor in target managers accepting an 
equity financed offer (their alternative explanation being that target managers have short 
horizons).  This leads to our fourth hypothesis: 
 
H4: Hostile bids will result in higher post bid returns than non-hostile bids. 
 
We also examine the inter-action between H1 and H4, so we expect cash-financed hostile 
acquisitions to be the best performing acquisitions, and equity financed non-hostile bids to be the 
worst.   We test hypotheses (1) through (4) by simple partitioning of the sample, using long run 
returns calculated from the bootstrapped and calendar time approaches described in Section III 
below.  However, there are other implications that flow from the “behavioral timing” hypothesis 
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and Shleifer and Vishny’s model that relate to aggregate behavior and returns.  First, if managers 
indulge in such timing activity, returns following “hot” periods, for mergers should be poorer, 
leading to hypothesis 5: 
 
H5: Returns following “hot” periods for merger activity will be lower than those following 
“cool” periods. 
 
Further, we should expect to see more use of equity-financing when markets are “expensive” and 
conversely, we should expect to see more cash financing when markets are “cheap” and interest 
rates are low.  The predicted effect of interest rates on equity bids is unclear.  On the one hand, 
high interest rates will encourage equity financing as opposed to cash financing.  On the other 
hand, high interest rates will depress economic activity and hence investment activity in general.   
 
This leads to our final two hypotheses: 
 
H6: Equity financing will be more prevalent than cash financing when aggregate stock market 
prices are high. 
 
H7: Cash financing will be more prevalent than equity financing when interest rates are low. 
 
We investigate these “behavioral timing” hypotheses directly, by regressing the number of bids 
of differing types on macro-economic variables that might reasonably proxy for market outlook 
and the “expensiveness” of the market. The question then arises as to which predictive factors are 
most appropriate to include in our model.  We require predictions of the likely cost of equity and 
debt financing.  One factor found to predict future stock returns is the lagged dividend yield ratio.  
However, for the UK, Harris and Sanchez-Valle (2000) have shown that the lagged ratio of the 
long Treasury Bond rate to dividend yield ratio (know as the “gilt-equity ratio” in UK markets) 
has considerably superior predictive power to dividend yield, having both stronger in sample and 
out of sample predictive ability.
3
 This variable is GEYR. We supplement this by a measure of 
                                                           
3
 The authors find a similar pattern is found in the US though the predictive power is much lower than in the UK. 
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recent market performance, the previous quarter’s return on the stock market in excess of the risk 
free rate (LAGRMRF).  We also require a prediction of debt costs.
4
  We note that long and short 
rates, and the term structure variable are highly correlated which is problematic when all three 
are included in the regression model with the gilt-equity yield ratio.  We therefore run two 
separate regressions for each type of acquisition, one using the treasury bill rate (LAGTBR), and 
the other using the long bond rate as measures of borrowing costs (LAGLONG). 
 
 
 
III. Models used to estimate long run abnormal returns 
 
A. Event Time methods 
Lyon et al (1999) note that the causes of misspecification include new listing or survivor bias, re-
balancing bias, and skewness bias, and demonstrate that alternative methods are available to 
counter such biases.  One uses traditional event-time modelling with inference based on either a 
boot-strapped version of a skewness adjusted t-statistic, or on empirical probability values 
calculated from a simulated distribution of mean long-run abnormal returns estimated from 
pseudo-portfolios. The alternative method involves accumulating calendar time returns.  Lyon et 
al (1999, p. 198) note that both methods have advantages and disadvantages, and conclude that 
the “pragmatic solution” to the problem of analyzing long-run abnormal returns is to use both.  
We follow that advice here. 
 
We first form the reference portfolios described in Lyon et al (1999) using UK data.  We then 
apply this reference portfolio technique to the set of medium to large UK takeovers (defined as 
those in excess of £10 million) for 1977 through 1992  and calculate abnormal returns for the 5 
years post takeover.  We then use both techniques used by Lyon et al (1999) to correct for 
skewness bias in the t-statistics.   
 
                                                           
4
 Note that there is no reliable indicator of UK Corporate Bond yields for the early years of our sample. 
 14
Given the smaller size of the UK stock market compared to the US, we form 10 x 5 reference 
portfolios, sorted on size (market capitalization) and book-to-market ratios as at the 30th June of 
the year t-1 (as in Lyon et al, 1999).  All  share returns are from the London Business School 
Share Price Database (LSPD), whilst all book-to-market ratios and market capitalization data are 
from Datastream.   Reference portfolio and acquirer firm returns are calculated using the “buy-
and-hold” method described in Lyon et al, (1999, p. 169): 
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where s is the beginning period, τ is the period of investment in months, Rit is the return on 
security i in month t, and ns is the number of securities traded in month s, the first period for the 
return calculation.  This represents the return on a passive investment portfolio with no monthly 
rebalancing.   
 
Note that we sort on market capitalization in descending order (i.e. decile 1 contains the largest 
firms), whilst book-to-market is sorted in ascending order (i.e. quintile 1 contains low book-to-
market or “glamour” firms).  The reference portfolio returns show that there are substantial and 
non-linear size and book-to-market effects in the UK, which mirror those reported in Lyon et al 
(199, p.171).  Three main points emerge: first, for all holding periods the returns for all periods 
are monotonically decreasing in size and increasing in book-to-market.  Second, the general 
pattern of returns for size and book-to-market effects appear to be consistent between the UK and 
the US.   
 
Given the conclusions in Lyon et al (1999) that buy-and-hold reference portfolios dominate 
rebalanced reference portfolios, we define the expected return on acquirer i,  [E(Riτ)] as the 
reference portfolio buy-and-hold return given by (1).  Abnormal returns are then defined as: 
 
AR R E Ri i iτ τ τ= − ( )         (2) 
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where ARiτ is the τ period buy-and-hold abnormal return for acquirer i, and Riτ is the τ period 
buy-and-hold return.  We then test for significance of the abnormal return using the bootstrapped 
skewness-adjusted t-statistic described in equation (6) of Lyon et al (1999, p. 174) and the 
pseudo-portfolio method described in Lyon et al (1999, pp. 175-176).  In all, we use 50 plus 10 
reference portfolios to form the pseudo-portfolio returns.  First, we use the 50 size and book to 
market portfolios described above.  Second, given the evidence in Loughran and Ritter (op. cit.)  
that benchmark portfolios formed on size alone capture around 90% of true abnormal returns, as 
opposed to the approximately 80% captured by size and book-to-market benchmarks, we also 
report results using ten size-decile reference portfolios.
5
  Evidence from Gregory, Harris and 
Michou (Tables 10-12, 2003) suggests that once size and market risk is allowed for, book-to-
market and HML do not appear to have a significant association with macro-economic risk, in 
contrast to the market risk premium and SMB factors which do.  As such, we place more reliance 
on the size-benchmarked results than the size and book-to-market matched results. 
 
An alternative measure of performance in event time is the Fama-French three factor model. The 
Fama-French model is given by: 
 
( )R R R R SMB HMLi f i i m f i iτ τ τ τ τ τ τα β γ δ ε− = + − + +  +                         i
(3)  
where Rft is the monthly return on three-month UK Treasury bills, Rmτ is the return on the (value 
weighted) FT All-Share Index, SMBτ is the difference in return between small and large 
companies, and HMLτ is the difference in return between high and low book-to-market 
companies.  The SML and HML factor portfolios are formed using the universe of UK stocks for 
which market capitalizations and returns, and book-to-market ratios are available on the LSPD 
and Datastream respectively. As in the Fama-French model, portfolios are formed using end-
June book-to-market ratios and market capitalizations in year t+1, with returns being 
accumulated from July t+1 to June t+2. We use a UK adaptation of that model here where 
                                                           
5
 Note that our simulation results suggest that the pseudo-portfolio method using buy-and-hold returns yields an 
unbiased measure of long-run abnormal returns for the UK. 
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portfolios are formed in a manner similar to that employed by Gregory and McCorriston (2004).  
Whereas Fama and French use the NYSE median to form breakpoints on size, and all NYSE 
stocks to form breakpoints on book-to-market, the UK stockmarket is characterized by a large 
number of small capitalization stocks.  To avoid the problems that  would be caused by setting 
breakpoints on the median of the whole market, we use the top 350 stocks to set size and book-
to-market breakpoints.
6
 
 
B. Calendar time method 
Calendar time portfolios can either be formed using the model described in Loughran and Ritter 
(1995) which employs the Fama-French three-factor model, or by using the calendar time 
abnormal return method (CTAR) of Mitchell and Stafford (p. 318, 2000).  We do both, and form 
calendar-time returns on a portfolio of acquirers which have, respectively, experienced an 
acquisition in the last twelve, thirty six, or sixty months.  The calendar-time returns are then used 
to estimate the regression: 
 
( )R R R R SMB HMLpt ft i i mt ft i t i t− = + − + +  +                           itα β γ δ ε
(4)  
where Rpt is the equally-weighted monthly return on the calendar-time portfolio.  Lyon et al 
(1999, p. 193, fn.12) note that the error term may be heteroskedastic as the number of securities 
in the portfolio varies from one month to the next.  However, they find that this does not affect 
their results to any significant degree.  Nonetheless, to take account of this possibility we 
estimate the calendar time regressions using the White (1980) correction for heteroskedasticity.   
 
The alternative CTAR model calculates the abnormal return for any calendar month as: 
 
)( ptptt RERCTAR −=       (5) 
 
                                                           
6
 We choose this cut-off because the FTSE includes all stocks in the top 350 companies in its FTSE 350 index, 
designed to capture the returns on small and medium size UK companies.  
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The expected return on the event portfolio is proxied by the return on the ten size reference 
portfolios described above.  We use size-matched portfolios for the reasons previously explained.   
 
C. Conditional Performance Method  
Recent work has shown that the assumption of unconditional asset pricing models may be flawed 
(Jaganathan and Wang, 1995).  If the true asset pricing process is a conditional one, a failure to 
take account of this will result in the “bad model” problem referred to in Fama (1998).  In such 
circumstances, unconditional models of stock returns could confuse abnormal performance with 
time variations in risks or risk premia.  To investigate whether the “bad model” problem has any 
role to play in explaining the performance of acquirers, we re-estimate our calendar time results 
under the assumption that coefficients are conditioned in the manner suggested in Ferson and 
Schadt (1996).  Conditioning models have not been as widely tested on UK data as in the US. 
However one study which found significant information in conditioning variables in the UK and 
other countries was due to Solnik (1993). Accordingly, we use three of the conditioning variables 
used by Solnik (1993) which are, respectively: (1) the lagged level of the one-month Treasury bill 
yield; (2) a lagged dividend yield (the yield on the FT All-Share Index); and (3) a lagged measure 
of the term structure of interest rates (the UK ten year Government Bond rate).
7
  Note that a 
quality spread variable is not available for the UK for the period of our study.  
 
In calendar time, we use a conditional Fama-French three factor model of the form: 
 
( ) [ ]( )
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    (6) 
where zt-1 is the vector of conditioning variables described above.   
 
Unfortunately, running (5) in event time is expensive in terms of degrees of freedom.  For our 
conditional event time regressions we therefore run the conditional model in Fama and French 
                                                           
7
 We also ran the model using a January dummy.  Results were qualitatively similar. 
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(1997) where SMB and HML are conditioned upon the previous month end log of market 
capitalization and book-to-market ratios respectively.
8
 
 
IV Sample data 
 
The data set consists of all successfully completed UK industrial and commercial company 
takeovers from 1977 to 1994 with a bid value of £10 million or greater
9
.  Although this cut-off is 
inevitably somewhat arbitrary, the value has been chosen to avoid the results being excessively 
influenced by very small deals.  This cut-off is also used in Gregory (1997).  The sample is drawn 
from the AMDATA database for all takeovers announced since 1984 (the date of introduction of 
the AMDATA service, which offers a comprehensive listing of all bids made for UK listed 
companies by UK companies), and before that date from the Financial Times.  Our initial sample 
of firms meeting these criteria is 776 firms.  Additional requirements are then imposed by the 
models used.  We estimate holding period returns models where size alone is controlled for and 
where both size and book to market are controlled for (as in Lyon et al., op. cit.).  For these 
models, we require that each acquirer’s share returns must be available on the LSPD and that 
matching records for the firm can be found on Datastream for the announcement period.  These 
requirements reduce the sample to 550 bids.  We further require that the acquirer’s market 
capitalization and its book-to-market ratio must be available on Datastream each month, for as 
long as the acquirer continues in business.  This further reduces the sample to 486 acquirers.  As 
an additional model, we also estimate simple event time regressions of the form used in Franks 
and Harris (1989), which require that returns be available on the LSPD from announcement to a 
minimum of 12 months after the month of announcement of the bid.  This results in a sub-sample 
of 480 acquirers.   
 
                                                           
8
 In contrast to Fama and French, we use absolute book-to-market ratio to condition HML rather than the log of the 
ratio, because of the small number of cases in the UK where book-to-market ratios are negative.  This is possible in 
the UK because of “dirty surplus” accounting that allowed firms (pre 1997) to write off goodwill directly against 
reserves.  
9
 We exclude investment trusts and banks, in part because of the different nature of book-to-market ratios and also 
because such ratios, required for portfolio matching, are unavailable on Datastream.  The cut-off excludes roughly 
one third of our dataset of UK takeovers by number, as there are a large number small takeovers. 
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Summary data on acquirers by size and book-to-market classifications are presented in Table 2 
Panel A.  Acquirers tend to be concentrated in the largest two deciles of market capitalization, 
with 63.1% of the sample falling into this category.  Only 6.1% of the sample are in the smallest 
four deciles by market capitalization.  By contrast, acquirers are fairly evenly distributed across 
book-to-market quintiles, although there is a slight tendency towards a concentration at the lower 
end of the book-to-market spectrum. Notably, only around 11.5% of the sample fall into the 
highest book-to-market quintile.   
 
Sub-analyses of the sample split cash versus non-cash, and hostile versus non-hostile are also 
reported in Table 2 Panel A.  Further analysis reveals that the size decile distribution of the cash 
sample is different from that of the non-cash sample.  Cash financing acquirers tend to be 
significantly larger than non-cash financing acquirers. Furthermore, cash acquirers tend to be 
concentrated in the middle book-to-market quintiles, whilst non-cash acquirers are monotonically 
decreasing in book-to-market quintile.  Most striking, however, is the distribution of type of 
financing across book-to-market quintile reported in Table 2, Panel B.  The proportion financing 
by equity decreases monotonically across quintiles, precisely the effect to be expected under the 
Loughran and Ritter “behavioral timing” hypothesis.  At the “glamour” end of the spectrum, 
69.5% of bidders use equity, a further 11.9% finance by mixed offers, whilst only 18.9% of 
bidders finance using cash.  In contrast, at the “value” end, Only 53.6% of bids are financed 
using equity, 14.3% use mixed offerings, whilst fully 32.1% use cash.  The evidence here is 
clearly supportive of Hypothesis 2.  Of course, one explanation is that book-to-market is a proxy 
for investment opportunities.  However, if this is the reason Hypothesis 2 is supported then there 
should be no pattern in the subsequent long run abnormal returns.  In other words, if this 
alternative explanation is valid, then Hypothesis 3 should be rejected. 
 
We also see from Table 2, Panel A, that the size and book-to-market distributions of hostile and 
non-hostile bidders are not significantly different from one another.  However, when we break 
down the distributions according to both form of financing and hostility, in Table 2 Panel C, 
some interesting differences emerge.  First, note that the book-to-market distribution of hostile 
and non-hostile takeovers is very similar.  However, there are differences in the size distribution.  
 20
65.7% of hostile equity acquirers are in the two largest market capitalization deciles, whilst 
51.5% of non-hostile acquirers are in these deciles.  The relatively small number of hostile cash 
acquirers are predominantly large firms that are located towards the “value” end of the book-to-
market spectrum. 
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V. Results 
A1. Event Time portfolios – basic analysis 
Our first and most simple test is to run cross-sectional Fama-French three-factor regressions and 
conditional Fama-French regressions.  These require a minimum of 12 months post-
announcement data and so can be estimated for 480 companies in our sample.  The regressions 
are run on the full 60 months post  announcement and results from the unconditional regressions 
are shown in Panel A of Table 3.  The overall alpha is significantly negative at 0.17% per month.  
The beta implies that acquirers are, on average, slightly riskier than the market average, whilst 
the three-factor coefficients show a significant positive loading on the SMB (size) risk factor but 
no significant loading on HML.  Partitioning the sample into non-cash and cash acquirers in our 
first, and most simple, test of Hypotheses 1a and 1b confirms the results from previous studies 
that equity acquirers have strongly negative abnormal performance (-0.21% per month; Table 3, 
Panel B), while cash acquirers have performance that is not significantly different from zero.  
Neither are mixed bids significantly different from zero.  Note also that the rank ordering of the 
form of payment is as predicted by the form of payment hypothesis (Agrawal and Jaffe, 2000).  
Partitioning on bid hostility shows that non-hostile bids are significantly negative, whilst hostile 
bids exhibit returns not significantly different from zero, providing evidence in support of 
hypothesis 4.  Following Rau and Vermaelen (op. cit), we classify bids according to whether they 
are “value” or “glamour” bidders. However, whilst Rau and Vermaelen partition their sample on 
a relative basis (i.e. the top 50% of acquirers by BTM are “value” firms), we partition on an 
absolute basis (i.e. on the basis of the BTM quintile to which the acquirer belongs).  By this 
definition the majority of our acquirers would be “glamour” firms.   From table 3, Panel C, in 
keeping with Rau and Vermaelen’s findings, there is distinct evidence of a “glamour” effect once 
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acquirers are partitioned into “glamour” (quintiles 1 and 2) and “value” (quintiles 4 & 5) 
categories.  Overall, “glamour” acquirers lose a significant 0.39% per month whilst “value” 
acquirers gain an insignificant 0.01% per month.  The sub-analysis of equity acquirers (the 
“glamour” acquirers of which would be expected to perform particularly adversely under the 
behavioural timing hypothesis [Loughran and Ritter, op. cit.] of Hypothesis 3) presented in Table 
3, Panel D shows that “glamour acquirers significantly under-perform (0.41% per month) whilst 
“value” acquirers exhibit no such under-performance. 
 
Our second group of tests use the Fama-French (1997) conditional 3-factor model.  These figures 
are reported in Table 4 and are qualitatively similar to those described above.  Overall under-
performance is a significant 0.17% per month, whilst equity bidders significantly under-perform 
(0.23% per month) as do non-hostile bidders (0.23% per month). As might be expected, 
conditioning SMB and HML reduces the difference between value and glamour returns, but not 
by much.  Glamour acquirers now show a significant -0.37% per month return, whilst value 
acquirers have an insignificant alpha equivalent to 0.07% per month.  For the equity sub-sample, 
glamour acquirers have a significant abnormal return of -0.39% per month, whilst value acquirers 
have an insignificant positive alpha equivalent to 0.02% per month. 
 
A2. Event Time portfolios – bootstrapped analysis 
The experiments conducted in Kothari and Warner (1997) provide evidence that the Fama-
French three-factor model may exhibit biases when used to estimate long-run returns.  
Furthermore, the problems which Loughran and Ritter (2000)  raise with regard to the Fama-
French model, which we discuss in Section II above, suggest that the use of Fama-French alphas, 
or a CAR approach using the three-factor model, are unlikely to yield a powerful test of under-
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performance by acquirers.  For that reason, for our event-time results we prefer to rely on the 
Lyon et al analysis of acquirer returns. 
 
First we use Lyon et al (1999) style buy-and-hold book-to-market and size (BTMS) reference 
portfolios, which demonstrate that acquirers exhibit substantial negative performance.  The 
results which are reported in Table 5, Panel A, columns 1-5, show negative abnormal returns of –
3.2% after 12 months and –15.1% after 36 months, rising to – 21.2% after 5 years.  Using either a 
skewness adjusted t-test, or empirical p-values based upon simulations of the pseudo-portfolios, 
the abnormal returns are significantly negative in all cases.   Taking account of the Loughran and 
Ritter (op. cit.) arguments for size controls, columns 6-10 show the results when the ten deciles 
are used as the benchmark portfolios rather than the 50 BTMS portfolios.  Under this metric, 
acquirer abnormal returns are a significant –3.6%, -17.1% and –25.6% after one, three and five 
years respectively.  
 
We then analyze the BTMS matched results by book-to-market quintile in Table 5, Panel B.  In 
contrast to the results from the analysis of Jensen alphas reported in Table 3, no clear value 
versus glamour effect emerges from returns calculated on a BTMS matched basis, with the 
exception that the extreme value portfolio exhibits the highest returns across all time periods, 
with an insignificant overall 5 year return of only -0.4%.  Given the smaller number of 
observations necessarily associated with sub-dividing the sample, significance levels for the 
remaining groups are somewhat mixed, although all four remaining quintiles exhibit significant 
negative performance after 36 months, at least at the 10% level, whether pseudo-portfolio or 
bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistics are used to calculate significance. Combining 
portfolios (not reported in Table 4) in the way described above yields a significant negative 60 
month performance of –24.9% for the “glamour” group; however, the “value” group is also 
significantly negative, though with a lower abnormal return of –19.2%.  Our way of interpreting 
this difference between the Jensen alpha analysis and the pseudo-portfolio analysis is that the 
latter shows that relative to similar book-to-market ratio firms, acquirers tend to fare badly in all 
but the highest market-to-book quintile.  However, in absolute terms, “value” acquirers do rather 
less poorly.  In essence this is because the performance of value firms in general is superior to 
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that of glamour firms, although whether or not this difference represents a risk effect is an open 
question.  Gregory, Harris and Michou (2003) present evidence that there are “value” anomalies 
in the UK market that do not seem to represent risk factors.  As previously noted, in some 
contrast to the evidence presented in Liew and Vassalou (2002), it is debatable as to whether 
HML captures macroeconomic risk, although SMB clearly does (Gregory et al, op.cit., Tables 8-
10).  This evidence is compatible with the Loughran and Ritter (op.cit.) argument that size 
benchmarked returns may be more appropriate measures of performance than BTMS 
benchmarked returns – and as we have already demonstrated in Table 5, Panel A, the size-
benchmarked abnormal returns are consistently worse than the BTMS-benchmarked abnormal 
returns.  Although the time period and methodology differ, our results here are in line with those 
reported for 1984-1998 by Conn et al (2004), although they provide less detailed groupings and 
do not sub-analyze equity and cash acquirers.
10
 
 
Strikingly, when we analyze the size-matched results by book-to-market quintile in Panel C of 
Table 5, we see clear evidence that the “glamour” set of acquirers exhibit economically and 
statistically significant negative returns.  BTM quintile 1 firms have abnormal returns of –10.1% 
after 12 months rising to –40.3% after 60 months, whilst BTM quintile 2 firms show returns of –
6.2% after 12 months rising to –48.6% after 60 months.  By contrast, the 60 month abnormal 
returns for the “neutral” BTM quintile 3 portfolio are only –16.6% after 60 months, compared to 
a figure of –12.7% for BTM 4 firms and +15.5% for the extreme “value” portfolio.   
 
In a direct test of Hypotheses 1a and 1b, Table 6 shows the BTMS-matched and size-matched 
results for equity, cash and mixed bids respectively.  Taking the BTMS-matched results from 
Panel A, for equity bids, returns are economically and statistically significantly negative for all 
time horizons under both metrics. Abnormal returns are –5.3% after one year, -20.7% after 3 
years and go on to reach –30.5% after 5 years.  By contrast, cash acquirers exhibit performance 
that is insignificantly different from zero.  Neither is the magnitude of the returns economically 
significant (-0.1% after 1 year, -2.6%  after three years, and +5.6% after five years).  Mixed 
offers exhibit negative abnormal returns of –26.3% after 5 years, but the figure is not statistically 
                                                           
10
 The Conn et al study reports results on a control firm matched size and book-to-market basis in calendar time. 
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significant, a result which partially reflects the low number of bidders in this class (n=59). In 
general, the ordering of these results provides support for the Agrawal and Jaffe (op. cit.) form of 
payment hypothesis.   Turning to the size-matched results in panel B of Table 6, we note that the 
qualitative results are identical, but abnormal returns are considerably more negative for the 
equity group (-36.4% after 60 months compared to a BTMS figure of –30.5%), slightly less for 
the cash-financing group, and very slightly worse for the mixed financing group. 
 
Given striking differences between the performances of equity and cash bidders, we test 
Hypothesis 3 by analyzing the performance of both groups by BTM quintile in Table 7.  Panel 
1A shows the BTMS-matched quintile results for equity bidders. With the notable exception of 
quintile 4 bidders, abnormal returns are more negative in the low BTM quintiles after 60 months, 
with the least negative (and insignificant) returns being recorded by the “value” BTM group, 
quintile 5.  All the other quintile groups exhibit significant negative performance, with the 60 
month returns for quintiles 1 (glamour) through 5 (value) being –39.2%, -31.8%, -23.7% -38.1%, 
and –5.0% respectively.  The evidence here is broadly supportive of the  Rau and Vermaelen 
“value firms” effect and our Hypothesis 3, but even bidders towards the “value” end of the 
spectrum which finance by equity do poorly to some extent.  However, when we look at the 
results on a size matched basis presented in panel 1B, we see strong evidence in favor of the 
“value firms” effect hypothesized by (3).  Returns are monotonically decreasing as we move 
from “value” to “glamour” quintiles, with both “value” groupings showing performance 
insignificantly different from zero, whilst “neutral” and “glamour” firms have significant 
negative performance, ranging from –23.2% (significant at the 10% level under the pseudo-
portfolio method only) for BTM 3 firms, to –53.6% for BTM 4 acquirers and –59.8% for the 
extreme “glamour” set of acquirers.  The pattern of returns exhibited here is entirely compatible 
with the Shleifer and Vishny (2003) story of stock-market driven acquisitions. 
 
Turning to cash bidders, the results reported in Table 7 Panel 2A are not terribly informative 
because of the low significance levels, almost certainly driven by the small number of bidders in 
each quintile.  Combining quintiles into the “glamour” and “value” categories described above 
still fails to yield statistically significant results; the glamour cash bidders earn (statistically 
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insignificant) abnormal returns of +29.5% after 60 months, whilst value cash bidders have 
(statistically insignificant) abnormal returns of –13.8% after 60 months.  A broadly similar story 
results from the size matched results reported in Panel 2B.  However, combining the cash and 
equity financing results and bearing in mind the results from Table 2, panel B, that show bidders 
appear to gear the financing of the bid according to the book-to-market quintile of the firm reveal 
a general pattern of evidence that is compatible with managers following “behavioral timing” as 
hypothesized by Loughran and Ritter (op. cit.) and Sheifer and Vishny (op. cit.).  That is, 
managers in the “glamour” category of firms that are over-valued exploit this position by issuing 
new equity to finance bids - these acquirers subsequently under-perform significantly.  By 
contrast, managers in the “glamour” category of firms that are not over-valued have no incentive 
to exploit their position and use cash to finance bids - these acquirers subsequently do not under-
perform.  However, some caution is necessary in arriving at this interpretation because of the 
lack of significance of the results for cash bidders in general.
11
 
 
In testing Hypothesis 4, we present results partitioned by bid hostility in Table 8.  From the 
BTMS results reported in Panel A, we see that for non-hostile bidders, the long run performance 
is unambiguously negative, no matter how significance is evaluated.  Columns 3-4 of Table 8 
show that non-hostile bidders in the UK have significant abnormal returns of –4.4% after 12 
months, -18.4% after 36 months and –23.6% after 60 months.  By contrast, the returns for hostile 
bidders are always insignificant, with the abnormal returns being –0.6%, -4.4% and –13.5% for 
the three horizons respectively.  Under the size-matched metric reported in Panel B, the 
conclusions for non-hostile bidders are identical.  Returns are somewhat more negative, at –
26.5% after 60 months.  However, the hostile group of acquirers exhibit considerably poorer 
performance under this metric and there is weak evidence from the bootstrapped skewness 
adjusted t-statistic that this negative performance may be significant. 
 
The evidence from the event-time analysis thus far seems conclusive.  For acquisitions 
completed during the period 1977-1994, UK acquiring firms significantly under-performed their 
pseudo-portfolio equivalents.  This confirms the findings of Limmack (1991), Kennedy and 
                                                           
11
 Note that we do not report quintile results for mixed-financing bidders because of the small number of 
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Limmack (1996), and Gregory (1997), but contradicts those of Higson and Elliott (1998).  Sub-
analyzing the sample suggests that:  
1. the form of payment is an important determinant of post-bid performance, in line with US 
findings and Hypotheses 1a and 1b;  
2. “friendly” bids significantly under-perform, in support of Hypothesis 4;  
3. In support of Hypothesis 3, there is some evidence of a “glamour” firms effect in UK 
takeovers, but only the extreme quintile of value firm bidders show performance which is not 
significantly different from zero when the size and BTMS-matched metric is employed. 
 
B.  The effects of hostility and cash offers 
 
As we noted above, the UK market facilitates the disaggregation of the effects of both the form 
of financing (equity, cash or mixed offers) and bid hostility. In Table 9, we present results that 
are partitioned simultaneously on hostility and form of financing.  A problem with such a 
partitioning is that the relatively small number of observations outside the largest group (equity 
financed non-hostile bids) leads to demanding levels of abnormal returns for significance to be 
established.  Nonetheless, on a BTMS-matched basis (Table 9, Panel A) we observe that returns 
for equity financing are more negative than those observed for non-equity acquirers, and that 
returns for hostile bids are greater than those associated with non-hostile bids. This is the case 
whether returns are measured at 1, 3 or 5 year intervals.  Equity financed non-hostile acquisitions 
exhibit highly significant negative performance at all horizons.  Whilst equity financed hostile 
bids show economically significant returns, these are only statistically significant after 5 years 
when the skewness-adjusted t-statistic is considered.  However, on a size-matched basis (Table 9, 
Panel B) it appears that hostile equity financed bids also exhibit negative performance.  Under 
this metric, the 60 month post bid returns are –37% for non-hostile equity bids, and –34.1% for 
equity-financed hostile bids.  The performance of cash non-hostile bids is not significantly 
different from zero under either metric.  However, the group of cash financed hostile bids exhibit 
5 year abnormal returns of just over 50% under the BTMS-matched benchmark.  These are 
significant at the 10% level using the pseudo-portfolio significance test.   Although numbers are 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
observations in each quintile grouping. 
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similar using the size-matched benchmark, at 49.5%, the figure just fails to be significant at the 
10% level. 
 
Overall, these results suggest that although form of payment may be the dominant explanatory 
factor, the type of bid also has an important inter-active role in explaining bidder outcomes, 
particularly for cash-financed acquisitions.   
 
C.  Calendar time results 
 
One explanation for the significance of the results reported in Tables 5-9 is that cross-sectional 
dependence of the abnormal returns causes the significance level to be overstated.  To test for 
this, we form calendar time portfolios as described above, and run the monthly regression of 
calendar time returns implied by equations (4) and (6), together with the CTAR method 
described in (5).  We do not report the results from the Fama-French model in detail given that 
Mitchell and Stafford (p. 321, 2000) note that the CTAR methodology is “plagued by fewer 
statistical flaws”, but draw attention to any differences that arise under the Fama-French method.  
The CTAR results are reported in Table 10.  They show that equity financing acquirers return a 
significant –0.429% per month average return (results from the Fama-French calendar time 
regressions in (4) and (6) reveal smaller but still significant abnormal returns). Ignoring 
compounding effects, this is equivalent to –25.74% over the 5-year post-acquisition period.  This 
is smaller than the -36.35% size-matched BHAR reported for equity-financing acquirers in Table 
6 but considerably larger than the abnormal returns implied by the alpha coefficients in Tables 3 
and 4.  Nonetheless, the statistical inferences from all methods are unambiguous when it comes 
to equity financed acquisitions.  The real surprise from the calendar time results is that cash bids 
are, at the 10% level at least, also significantly negative, with returns being –0.26% per month 
(Table 10, panel A), equivalent to –15.6% after 5 years, ignoring compounding effects, which 
contrasts with the event time result of an insignificant +3%. Under the Fama-French calendar 
time approach from (4) and (6), the monthly alpha is again negative (-0.137% and –0.131% 
respectively) for cash bids, but not significant.  Partitioning on hostility confirms the event time 
results from Table 8 in that friendly bids exhibit strong negative performance of –0.49% per 
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month, significant at the 1% level.  The scale of this result is marginally greater than that found 
under the event time BHARs.
12
  Hostile bids exhibit performance that is not significantly 
different from zero..  
 
As Loughran and Ritter (2000) argue, if managers of acquiring firms exhibit “behavioral timing” 
in formulating their decisions, then calendar time weighting will bias any experiment in favor of 
the null hypothesis.  Furthermore, according to H5, we would expect returns to be lower 
following “hot” periods of M&A activity.  We report results in Panel B of Table 10 from 
examining “hot” periods, defined as those where the number of firms in the portfolio is greater 
than the median.  As would be expected under the Loughran and Ritter hypothesis, “hot period” 
or “high intensity month” abnormal returns to equity financed acquisitions are considerably 
worse at –0.511% per month, significant at the 1% level.  Turning to cash-financed acquisitions, 
the “hot” period results in Panel B of Table 10 show that high-intensity bid months are far worse 
than the whole sample period. Looking at “hot” months reveals that CTARs for hostile bids 
during this period are–0.385% per month, significant at the 10% level.  Only in the case of 
friendly bids are the results for “hot” months in Panel B of table 10 no worse than those for all 
months.  Taken as a whole, the results indicate that mergers undertaken in “hot” periods fare 
worse than those in “cold” periods.  This stands in some contrast to the results reported in 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000, Table 8 and pp. 317-318), who find that acquirer returns in calendar 
time are not systematically related to event intensity.  
 
Table 11, Panel A presents calendar time returns for two-way partitions by form of financing and 
bid hostility.  In calendar time, only equity-financed non-hostile (-0.498% per month) and cash-
financed non-hostile bids (-0.338% per month) exhibit significant negative performance (note 
that the latter are negative but not significantly so when estimated using the Fama-French 
methods described in [4] and [6]).  Intriguingly, equity-financed hostile bids do better than cash-
financed non-hostile bids in these tests.  Last, cash-financed hostile bids do not exhibit 
performance significantly different from zero, and the scale of the returns implied by the 
abnormal return of 0.2% per month is much less than that obtained from the event-time results.  
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Overall calendar time results from (4) and (6) give qualitatively similar results. 
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However, once we separate out “hot” periods (Table 11, panel B) we see that abnormal 
performance worsens considerably for both equity “friendly” bids and equity non-hostile bids – 
the latter are now significantly negative.  The same is true with regard to the results for cash non-
hostile bids.  Only the conclusions in respect of cash hostile bids remain unaffected by the sub-
analysis of “hot” periods. 
 
D. Bid Timing Results 
 
Clearly, there are important weighting differences between event period returns and calendar 
time returns.  If, following Shleifer and Vishny, and as hypothesized in H6 and H7, there is a 
propensity to use more equity financing in “good” times when stock prices are high, and more 
cash financing in “bad” times when stock prices are lower, then as Loughran and Ritter (2000) 
note, calendar time portfolios thus formed are inherently biased towards supporting the null 
hypothesis.  If managers really do have timing ability, they will tend to carry out more stock 
financed acquisitions when stock prices are high, and so weighting each time period equally will 
ignore this important aspect of timing.  In particular, this will tend to understate the (negative) 
significance of stock-financing acquirer returns.   
 
In order to test hypotheses 6 and 7, we can accumulate bids either monthly or quarterly for the 
purposes of this analysis.  We use quarterly data in the results reported, to avoid the problem of a 
preponderance of zero bids in some months for the sub-analyses (particularly cash bid sub-
analysis), but also repeat the analysis using monthly data, when results are qualitatively similar.  
These data are so-called “count” data, meaning that OLS regressions are not appropriate.  The 
approach required can be either a poisson regression or a negative binomial regression, 
depending on the distribution of the dependent variable.  Tests (see Greene, 2000, chapter 19) 
indicate that in general our count data are not poisson distributed, and our results are reported 
using the negative binomial model.  These regressions are reported in Table 12, and the results 
are striking.  First note that in general acquisition activity is driven by the expensiveness of the 
market as proxied by GEYR, the more fully valued the market, the greater the likelihood of bid 
activity, whereas activity is negatively associated with long run interest rates (LAGLONG).  
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Compatible with hypotheses 6 and 7, equity financed bids are more likely to be observed when 
the gilt-equity rate is high (that is, when markets are “expensive”). When the long interest rate 
model is used, equity bids are more likely when equity markets are “expensive” and less likely 
when long interest rates are high.  By contrast, cash bids are more likely to be observed when 
market performance is poor (as measured by LAGRMRF) and when long run interest rates are 
low.
13
   
 
VI. Conclusions 
First, this paper has shown that the poor performance of UK acquirers cannot be explained by 
biases in the estimation of long run abnormal returns, nor mis-specification of test statistics 
resulting from forming portfolios in event time rather than calendar time.  We have also shown 
that using a conditional form of the three-factor model leads to qualitatively similar results.  This 
first result is an important one because it confirms that the UK experience is similar to that 
suggested by recent US studies, and is not one of zero abnormal performance as suggested by the 
recent work of Higson and Elliott (1998).  On average, UK acquirers have under-performed in a 
manner similar to that shown to apply to US acquirers by Agrawal et al (1992).  Furthermore, we 
have shown that it is equity acquirers that exhibit substantial negative abnormal returns, as 
shown for the US by Loughran and Vijh (1997).  However, whilst we find UK equity financing 
acquirers exhibit significant negative abnormal returns to their US counterparts, we do not find 
that UK cash acquirers earn significant  positive returns. 
 
Our evidence is strongly supportive of the “form of payments” hypothesis suggested by Agrawal 
and Jaffe (2000).  Importantly, the “natural experiment” suggested by the nature of the UK 
market for corporate control shows that whilst form of payment considerations tend to dominate 
the nature of the bid (degree of hostility) in determining long-run acquirer returns, the inter-
action of the form of payment and nature of the bid are important in explaining performance.  
Equity financed friendly bids exhibit economically and statistically significant negative 
performance under all metrics.  Cash financed hostile bids show some weak evidence of 
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 Note that the predictive model using short run rates is not statistically significant so is not reported. 
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exhibiting positive post bid performance, although the conclusions drawn on this are metric 
dependent and do not hold in the calendar time analysis.    
 
We also provide evidence that acquirers in the highest book-to-market quintiles appear to have 
better performance than other quintile groups.  This finding is compatible with the “performance 
extrapolation” hypothesis of Agrawal and Jaffe (2000), the “value” effect found in Rau and 
Vermaelen (1998) and the Shleifer and Vishny (2003) explanation that acquisitions are driven by 
market valuation characteristics. 
 
We obtain stronger results in event time than in calendar time.  In event time we show that equity 
financed hostile bids also exhibit negative performance.  These differences between the event 
time and calendar time regressions led us to examine directly the “behavioral timing” hypothesis 
of Loughran and Ritter (2000).  We find evidence to support this hypothesis, and in particular 
find that the form of financing appears to be chosen as would be expected given a “windows of 
opportunity” hypothesis.  In such circumstances, as Loughran and Ritter point out, tests based 
upon calendar time regressions will be biased towards supporting the null hypothesis.  Sub-
analysis of “hot” periods in calendar time confirms the results we obtain from the event-time 
BHAR approach.  For this reason we place more weight upon our results from the event time 
tests rather than the calendar time regressions. 
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Table 1: Shareholding patterns (in percent) in the UK and US, 1970-1995 
UK DATA 
PENSION 
FUNDS 
INSURANCE 
COS 
UNIT 
TRUSTS 
IINVESTMENT 
TRUSTS & 
OTHER FIN. 
INST. 
BANK 
PERSONAL 
TRUSTS FOREIGN 
INDIVIDUALS & 
CHARITIES OTHER TOTAL 
INSTITUTION-
AL TOTAL 
1975 16.8 15.9 4.1 10.5 N/A 5.6 39.8 7.3 100 47.3
1981 26.7 20.5 3.6 6.8 N/A 3.6 30.4 8.4 100 57.6
1990 31.7 20.4 6.1 2.3 N/A 11.8 22.2 5.5 100 60.5
1994 27.8 21.9 6.8 3.3 N/A 16.3 21.6 2.4 100 59.8
1999 19.6 21.6 2.7 7 N/A 29.3 16.6 3.3 100 50.9
           
US DATA 
PENSION 
FUNDS 
INSURANCE 
COS 
Open 
Ended 
MUTUAL 
Closed Ended 
MUTUAL 
BANK PERS 
TRUSTS FOREIGN 
HOUESHOLD & 
NON-PROFIT OTHER  
INSTITUTION-
AL TOTAL 
1970 9.2 3.3 4.7 0.5 10.5 3.2 68.0 0.6 100 17.7
1990 24.4 4.6 6.6 0.5 5.4 6.9 51.0 0.7 100 36.0
1995 23.2 5.3 12.1 0.5 2.7 6.2 49.1 1.0 100 41.1
1999 17.9 6.0 17.4 0.2 1.7 7.9 47.7 1.3 100 41.4
 
Sources: UK Data are from the Office Of National Statistics, Share Ownership Report as at 31
st
 December 2003. Available on line 
at www.statistics.gov.uk.  US data are derived from the NYSE Factbook On Line at www.nysedata.com/factbook/.  
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Table 2: Summary data.   Panel A: Acquirers by market capitalization decile and book-to-market quintile.  For Market 
Capitalisation Deciles, 1 is the largest and 10 the smallest.  For Book-to-Market Quitiles, 1 is Low (i.e. “Glamour”) whilst 5 is high 
(i.e. “value”) 
DECILE/ 
QUIN-
TILE 
MKT. 
CAP BTM 
MKT. 
CAP % BTM % 
MKT. 
CAP BTM 
MKT. 
CAP 
% 
BTM 
% 
MKT. 
CAP BTM 
MKT. 
CAP 
% 
BTM 
% 
MKT. 
CAP BTM 
MKT. 
CAP 
% 
BTM 
% 
MKT. 
CAP BTM 
MKT. 
CAP % BTM % 
Group Overall Overall Overall Overall Cash Cash Cash Cash 
Non-
cash 
Non-
cash 
Non-
cash 
Non-
cash Hostile Hostile Hostile Hostile 
Non-
hostile 
Non-
hostile 
Non-
hostile 
Non-
hostile 
1 197 118 40.5% 24.3% 73 22 61.9% 18.6% 124 96 33.7% 26.1% 53 30 46.5% 26.3% 144 88 38.7% 23.7%
2 110 116 22.6% 23.9% 21 24 17.8% 20.3% 89 92 24.2% 25.0% 29 26 25.4% 22.8% 81 90 21.8% 24.2%
3 69 106 14.2% 21.8% 14 25 11.9% 21.2% 55 81 14.9% 22.0% 9 23 7.9% 20.2% 60 83 16.1% 22.3%
4 34 90 7.0% 18.5% 4 29 3.4% 24.6% 30 61 8.2% 16.6% 12 23 10.5% 20.2% 22 67 5.9% 18.0%
5 28 56 5.8% 11.5% 3 18 2.5% 15.3% 25 38 6.8% 10.3% 6 12 5.3% 10.5% 22 44 5.9% 11.8%
6 18  3.7%  1  0.8%  17  4.6%  3  2.6%  15  4.0%  
7 13  2.7%  0  0.0%  13  3.5%  1  0.9%  12  3.2%  
8 8  1.6%  1  0.8%  7  1.9%  0  0.0%  8  2.2%  
9 5  1.0%  1  0.8%  4  1.1%  0  0.0%  5  1.3%  
10 4  0.8%  0  0.0%  4  1.1%  1  0.9%  3  0.8%  
Total 486 486 100% 100% 118 118 100% 100% 368 368 100% 100% 114 114 100% 100% 372 372 100% 100%
 
Panel B: Proportion of bidders in each book to market quintile choosing cash, equity or mixed financing 
TYPE N MEAN N MEAN N MEAN N MEAN N MEAN 
Quintile 1. (low BTM) 2 3 4 
5.(high 
BTM)
CASH 118 18.64% 116 20.69% 106 23.59% 90 32.22% 56 32.14%
EQUITY 118 69.49% 116 68.10% 106 62.26% 90 57.78% 56 53.57%
MIXED 118 11.86% 116 11.21% 106 14.15% 90 10.00% 56 14.29%
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Panel C: Acquirers by market capitalization decile and book-to-market quintile partitioned by form of financing and bidder hostility.  
For Market Capitalisation Deciles, 1 is the largest and 10 the smallest.  For Book-to-Market Quitiles, 1 is Low (i.e. “Glamour”) whilst 
5 is high (i.e. “value”) 
  
DECILE/QUINTILE 
MKT. 
CAP BTM 
MKT. 
CAP % BTM % 
MKT. 
CAP BTM 
MKT. 
CAP % BTM % 
MKT. 
CAP BTM 
MKT. 
CAP % BTM % 
MKT. 
CAP BTM 
MKT. 
CAP % BTM % 
Group 
Equity 
non-host 
Equity 
non-host 
Equity 
non-host 
Equity 
non-host 
Equity 
Host 
Equity 
Host 
Equity 
Host 
Equity 
Host 
Cash 
Non-host 
Cash 
Non-host 
Cash 
Non-host 
Cash 
Non-host 
Cash 
Host 
Cash 
Host 
Cash 
Host 
Cash 
Host 
1 72 64 30.1% 26.8% 29 18 41.4% 25.7% 58 17 59.8% 17.5% 15 5 71.4% 23.8%
2 52 59 21.8% 24.7% 17 20 24.3% 28.6% 18 23 18.6% 23.7% 3 1 14.3% 4.8%
3 41 51 17.2% 21.3% 7 15 10.0% 21.4% 13 21 13.4% 21.6% 1 4 4.8% 19.0%
4 18 43 7.5% 18.0% 9 9 12.9% 12.9% 3 20 3.1% 20.6% 1 9 4.8% 42.9%
5 18 22 7.5% 9.2% 5 8 7.1% 11.4% 2 16 2.1% 16.5% 1 2 4.8% 9.5%
6 13  5.4%  2  2.9%  1  1.0%  0  0.0%  
7 12  5.0%  1  1.4%  0  0.0%  0  0.0%  
8 7  2.9%  0  0.0%  1  1.0%  0  0.0%  
9 4  1.7%  0  0.0%  1  1.0%  0  0.0%  
10 2  0.8%  0  0.0%  0  0.0%  0  0.0%  
sum 239 239 100% 100% 70 70 100% 100% 97 97 100% 100% 21 21 100% 100%
Glam    51.5%    54.3%    41.2%    28.6%
Val    27.2%    24.3%    37.1%    52.4%
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Table 3: Event time returns from FF 3-factor model.  Results are coefficients for the entire sample in Panel A, and Jensen alphas 
(monthly) for the sub-analyses reported in panels B to D.  All coefficients are calculated over the period up to 60-months post bid.  
Sub-analyses are presented by form of financing, bid hostility and book-to-market ratio of acquirer. 
Panel A          
Sub-analysis Overall Overall Overall Overall       
Factor Rm-Rf SMB HML Alpha       
Mean 1.0942 0.6057 0.0468 -0.0017       
t-test 66.1212 14.6758 1.1965 -2.2638       
Panel B          
Sub-analysis Cash Bid Equity bid Mixed bid Hostile Non-hostile     
  alpha alpha alpha alpha alpha     
Mean -0.0008 -0.0021 -0.0011 -0.0008 -0.0020     
t-test -0.5114 -2.1943 -0.7522 -0.5464 -2.3827     
Panel C        
Sub-analysis Overall Overall Overall Overall Overall Overall Overall 
  BTM1 BTM2 BTM3 BTM4 BTM5 Glamour Value 
  alpha alpha alpha alpha alpha alpha alpha 
Mean -0.0026 -0.0051 -0.0004 0.0006 0.0017 -0.0039 0.0010 
t-test -1.4153 -3.7393 -0.2304 0.4768 1.0802 -3.3539 1.0653 
Panel D        
Sub-analysis Equity Equity Equity Equity Equity Overall Overall 
  BTM1 BTM2 BTM3 BTM4 BTM5 Glamour Value 
  alpha alpha alpha alpha alpha alpha alpha 
Mean -0.0028 -0.0054 -0.0007 0.0005 0.0008 -0.0041 0.0006 
t-test -1.2675 -3.2292 -0.2405 0.3613 0.3996 -2.9501 0.5339 
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Table 4: Event time returns from conditional FF 3-factor model.  Results are coefficients for the entire sample in Panel A, and 
Jensen alphas (monthly) for the sub-analyses reported in panels B to D.  SMB and HML are conditioned upon the previous month end 
log of market capitalization and book-to-market ratios respectively.  All coefficients are calculated over the period up to 60-months 
post bid.  Sub-analyses are presented by form of financing, bid hostility and book-to-market ratio of acquirer. 
Panel A          
Sub-analysis Overall Overall Overall Overall       
Factor Rm-Rf SMB HML Alpha       
Mean 1.0951 1.9686 0.1980 -0.0017       
t-test 59.9787 2.3035 0.2829 -2.1948       
Panel B          
Sub-analysis Cash Bid Equity bid Mixed bid Hostile Non-hostile     
  alpha alpha alpha alpha alpha     
Mean -0.0006 -0.0023 -0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0023     
t-test -0.3306 -2.3023 -0.5910 -0.2116 -2.4781     
Panel C        
Sub-analysis Overall Overall Overall Overall Overall Overall Overall 
  BTM1 BTM2 BTM3 BTM4 BTM5 Glamour Value 
  alpha alpha alpha alpha alpha alpha alpha 
Mean -0.0030 -0.0044 -0.0006 0.0003 0.0014 -0.0037 0.0007 
t-test -1.4911 -3.4766 -0.2932 0.2599 0.9083 -3.1211 0.7840 
Panel D        
Sub-analysis Equity Equity Equity Equity Equity Overall Overall 
  BTM1 BTM2 BTM3 BTM4 BTM5 Glamour Value 
  alpha alpha alpha alpha alpha alpha alpha 
Mean -0.0032 -0.0047 -0.0015 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0039 0.0002 
t-test -1.5155 -2.9485 -0.4633 0.1336 0.1185 -2.9680 0.1784 
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Table 5: Overall bidder returns. Figures show excess returns with pseudo-portfolio significance levels, followed by bootstrapped 
skewness adjusted t-statistic.  Significance levels are shown for the t-statistics and for the Lyon et al (1999) pseudo-portfolio sampling 
method. Significance levels are denoted by * (10%), **(5%), and ***(1%) using two-tailed tests.  Two alternative matching 
procedures are presented: BTMS denotes book-to-market and sized matched excess returns, whilst size-matched denotes excess 
returns benchmarked against decile portfolios only.  Panel A presents the overall results.  Panel B presents the results partitioned by 
book to market quintile when bidder returns are BTMS matched; Panel C presents the returns partitioned by book to market quintile 
when returns are size-matched. 
Panel A: Overall results 
Pseudo Portfolio Sampling results: 
BTMS matched   
Pseudo Portfolio Sampling results: 
Size-matched   
Year 1 Excess bidder return -0.03188 ** 486 Year 1 Excess bidder return -0.03666 ** 486 
Year 3 Excess bidder return -0.1513 *** 486 Year 3 Excess bidder return -0.17123 *** 486 
Year 5 Excess bidder return -0.21231 *** 486 Year 5 Excess bidder return -0.25559 *** 486 
Bootstrapped Skewness-adjusted t-
statistics: BTMS matched 
No. of 
Observations 
Bootstrapped Skewness-adjusted t-
statistics: Size-matched 
No. of 
Observations 
Year 1 T-statistic -2.05504 ** 486 Year 1 T-statistic -2.34277 *** 486 
Year 3 T-statistic -4.53277 *** 486 Year 3 T-statistic -5.05093 *** 486 
Year 5 T-statistic -3.5939 *** 486 Year 5 T-statistic -4.30281 *** 486 
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Panel B: Results partitioned on book-to-market quintile – BTMS matched 
 
Quintile/no. obs in 
quintile 1 118 2 116 3 106 4 90 5 56 
Pseudo Portfolio Sampling results:         
Year Statistic Value Sig. level Value Sig. level Value Sig. level Value Sig. level Value Sig. level 
Year 1 Excess bidder return -0.05976 ns -0.02691 ns -0.0341 ns -0.0552 * 0.058296 ns 
Year 3 Excess bidder return -0.16979 * -0.14684 * -0.1162 * -0.23653 *** -0.05102 ns 
Year 5 Excess bidder return -0.20362 ns -0.29611 *** -0.1583 ns -0.30888 ** -0.00408 ns 
Bootstrapped Skewness-adjusted t-statistics:         
Year 1 T-statistic -1.60275 ns -0.88012 ns -1.01028 ns -1.98242 * 1.541671 ns 
Year 3 T-statistic -2.1434 * -2.25774 ** -1.80637 * -3.28174 *** -0.51297 ns 
Year 5 T-statistic -1.68823 ns -1.92373 * -1.32902 ns -2.42343 ** -0.01902 ns 
 
Panel C: Results partitioned on book-to-market quintile – size matched 
 
Quintile/no. obs in 
quintile 1 118 2 116 3 106 4 90 5 56 
Pseudo Portfolio Sampling results:         
Year Statistic Value Sig. level Value Sig. level Value Sig. level Value Sig. level Value Sig. level 
Year 1 Excess bidder return -0.10102 *** -0.06246 * -0.02028 ns -0.01766 ns 0.090812 ns 
Year 3 Excess bidder return -0.30721 *** -0.26079 *** -0.10077 ns -0.10859 ns 0.066792 ns 
Year 5 Excess bidder return -0.40311 *** -0.48566 *** -0.16604 ns -0.12667 ns 0.155143 ns 
Bootstrapped Skewness-adjusted t-statistics:         
Year 1 T-statistic -2.69516 ** -2.00466 * -0.56972 ns -0.66475 ns 2.605857 ** 
Year 3 T-statistic -3.6001 ** -3.68392 *** -1.61986 ns -1.6844 ns 0.744349 ns 
Year 5 T-statistic -3.30671 *** -2.5874 ** -1.45673 ns -1.12569 ns 1.171669 ns 
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Table 6: Bidder excess returns by form of payment. Figures show excess returns with pseudo-portfolio significance levels, 
followed by bootstrapped skewness adjusted t-statistic.  Significance levels are shown for the t-statistics and for the Lyon et al (1999) 
pseudo-portfolio sampling method. Significance levels are denoted by * (10%), **(5%), and ***(1%) using two-tailed tests.  Two 
alternative matching procedures are presented: BTMS denotes book-to-market and sized matched excess returns, whilst size-matched 
denotes excess returns benchmarked against decile portfolios only.  Panel A presents the results partitioned by form of financing when 
bidder returns are BTMS matched; Panel B presents the returns partitioned by form of financing when returns are size-matched.   
Panel A: BTM and size-matched 
 
Classification/no. 
obs in class Equity 309 Cash 118 mixed 59 
Pseudo Portfolio Sampling results:     
Year Statistic Value Sig. Level Value Sig. Level Value Sig. Level 
Year 1 Excess bidder return -0.05346 *** -0.0011 ns 0.019621 ns 
Year 3 Excess bidder return -0.20731 *** -0.0264 ns -0.10775 ns 
Year 5 Excess bidder return -0.30515 *** 0.056245 ns -0.2632 ns 
Bootstrapped Skewness-adjusted t-statistics:    
Year 1 T-statistic -2.60527 ** -0.01634 ns 0.669567 ns 
Year 3 T-statistic -5.37981 *** -0.34902 ns -1.0129 ns 
Year 5 T-statistic -4.53835 *** 0.46846 ns -1.59562 ns 
Panel B: Size-matched 
 
Classification/no. 
obs in class Equity 309 Cash 118 mixed 59 
Pseudo Portfolio Sampling results:     
Year Statistic Value Sig. Level Value Sig. Level Value Sig. Level 
Year 1 Excess bidder return -0.05869 *** 0.000157 ns 0.005072 ns 
Year 3 Excess bidder return -0.24124 *** -0.02172 ns -0.10355 ns 
Year 5 Excess bidder return -0.36352 *** 0.03472 ns -0.27096 ns 
Bootstrapped Skewness-adjusted t-statistics:    
Year 1 T-statistic -2.77644 *** 0.020836 ns 0.175367 ns 
Year 3 T-statistic -6.01467 *** -0.29984 ns -0.95471 ns 
Year 5 T-statistic -5.25016 *** 0.314019 ns -1.60064 ns 
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Table 7: Bidder results partitioned on book-to-market quintile. Figures show excess returns with pseudo-portfolio significance 
levels, followed by bootstrapped skewness adjusted t-statistic.  Significance levels are shown for the t-statistics and for the Lyon et al 
(1999) pseudo-portfolio sampling method. Significance levels are denoted by * (10%), **(5%), and ***(1%) using two-tailed tests.  
Two alternative matching procedures are presented: BTMS denotes book-to-market and sized matched excess returns, whilst size-
matched denotes excess returns benchmarked against decile portfolios only.  Panel 1A presents the equity bidder results partitioned by 
book to market quintile when bidder returns are BTMS matched; Panel 1B presents the equity bidder results partitioned by book to 
market quintile when returns are size-matched.  Panel 2A presents the cash bidder results partitioned by book to market quintile when 
bidder returns are BTMS matched; Panel 2B presents the cash bidder results partitioned by book to market quintile when returns are 
size-matched.   
 
Panel 1A: Equity bidder results – BTM and size matched 
 
Quintile/no. obs in 
quintile 1 82 2 79 3 66 4 52 5 30 
Pseudo Portfolio Sampling results:         
Year Statistic Value Sig. level Value Sig. level Value Sig. level Value Sig. level Value Sig. level 
Year 1 Excess bidder return -0.11827 ** -0.05124 ns -0.0163 Bidders: -0.07049 * 0.065571 ns 
Year 3 Excess bidder return -0.31717 *** -0.1457 * -0.16051 * -0.24686 *** -0.10364 ns 
Year 5 Excess bidder return -0.39207 *** -0.31845 *** -0.2374 ** -0.38134 ** -0.04951 ns 
Bootstrapped Skewness-adjusted t-statistics:         
Year 1 T-statistic -2.73502 *** -1.50981 ns -0.31395 ns -1.94512 * 1.145492 ns 
Year 3 T-statistic -4.17478 *** -2.00484 * -1.77896 ns -2.85727 ** -0.85609 ns 
Year 5 T-statistic -3.31441 *** -2.58902 ** -1.27203 ns -2.75843 ** -0.31162 ns 
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Panel 1B: Equity bidder results – size matched 
 
Quintile/no. obs in 
quintile 1 82 2 79 3 66 4 52 5 30 
Pseudo Portfolio Sampling results:         
Year Statistic Value Sig. level Value Sig. level Value Sig. level Value Sig. level Value Sig. level 
Year 1 Excess bidder return -0.1718 *** -0.09294 *** 0.010686 ns -0.021 ns 0.122679 ns 
Year 3 Excess bidder return -0.47948 *** -0.29314 *** -0.14353 ns -0.08202 ns 0.05569 ns 
Year 5 Excess bidder return -0.5977 *** -0.53569 *** -0.23169 * -0.19317 ns 0.144676 ns 
Bootstrapped Skewness-adjusted t-statistics:         
Year 1 T-statistic -3.77332 *** -2.72111 ** 0.254834 ns -0.61024 ns 2.328995 ns 
Year 3 T-statistic -5.8012 *** -3.80008 *** -1.65184 ns -1.05267 ns 0.482759 ns 
Year 5 T-statistic -4.38326 *** -4.0493 *** -1.31611 ns -1.59706 ns 0.820986 ns 
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Panel 2A: Cash bidder results – BTM and size matched 
 
Quintile/no. obs in 
quintile 1 22 2 24 3 25 4 29 5 18 
Pseudo Portfolio Sampling results:         
Year Statistic Value Sig. level Value Sig. level Value Sig. level Value Sig. level Value Sig. level 
Year 1 Excess bidder return 0.061165 ns 0.024339 ns -0.09467 ** -0.01266 ns 0.037467 ns 
Year 3 Excess bidder return 0.41348 ns -0.21505 ns -0.05166 ns -0.24224 * 0.070305 ns 
Year 5 Excess bidder return 0.607077 ns 0.009812 ns -0.0195 ns -0.30847 ns 0.137714 ns 
Bootstrapped Skewness-adjusted t-statistics:         
Year 1 T-statistic 0.726263 ns 0.329696 ns -2.59873 ** -0.22686 ns 0.633771 ns 
Year 3 T-statistic 1.887877 ns -1.13137 ns -0.59227 ns -1.69454 ns 0.798332 ns 
Year 5 T-statistic 1.80422 ns 0.126832 ns -0.16524 ns -1.20789 ns 0.869261 ns 
 
Panel 2B: Cash bidder results – size matched 
 
Quintile/no. obs in 
quintile 1 22 2 24 3 25 4 29 5 18 
Pseudo Portfolio Sampling results:         
Year Statistic Value Sig. level Value Sig. level Value Sig. level Value Sig. level Value Sig. level 
Year 1 Excess bidder return 0.04408 ns 0.015611 ns -0.10395 * 0.011772 ns 0.051749 ns 
Year 3 Excess bidder return 0.32515 * -0.2488 ns -0.07213 ns -0.15801 ns 0.146683 ns 
Year 5 Excess bidder return 0.366329 ns -0.11751 ns -0.10556 ns -0.12034 ns 0.277044 ns 
Bootstrapped Skewness-adjusted t-statistics:         
Year 1 T-statistic 0.541903 ns 0.220851 ns -2.97309 *** 0.26923 ns 0.908505 ns 
Year 3 T-statistic 1.616216 ns -1.2388 ns -0.85833 ns -1.20729 ns 1.543781 ns 
Year 5 T-statistic 1.110423 ns -0.16073 ns -0.82935 ns -0.51479 ns 1.624557 ns 
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Table 8: Bidder returns partitioned by hostility. Figures show excess returns with pseudo-portfolio significance levels, followed by 
bootstrapped skewness adjusted t-statistic.  Significance levels are shown for the t-statistics and for the Lyon et al (1999) pseudo-
portfolio sampling method. Significance levels are denoted by * (10%), **(5%), and ***(1%) using two-tailed tests.  Two alternative 
matching procedures are presented: BTMS denotes book-to-market and sized matched excess returns, whilst size-matched denotes 
excess returns benchmarked against decile portfolios only.  Panel A presents the results partitioned by bidder hostility when bidder 
returns are BTMS matched; Panel B presents the returns partitioned by bidder hostility when returns are size-matched.   
Panel A: BTM and size-matched 
 
Classification/no. 
obs in class 
Non-
hostile 372 Hostile 
 
114 
Pseudo Portfolio Sampling results:   
Year Statistic Value Sig. Level Value Sig. Level 
Year 1 Excess bidder return -0.04378 *** 0.006963 ns 
Year 3 Excess bidder return -0.18426 *** -0.04375 ns 
Year 5 Excess bidder return -0.23592 *** -0.13526 ns 
Bootstrapped Skewness-adjusted t-statistics:  
Year 1 T-statistic -2.56712 *** 0.203052 ns 
Year 3 T-statistic -4.83495 *** -0.60358 ns 
Year 5 T-statistic -3.37338 *** -1.12108 ns 
Panel B: Size-matched 
 
Classification/no. 
obs in class 
Non-
hostile 372 Hostile 114 
Pseudo Portfolio Sampling results:   
Year Statistic Value Sig. Level Value Sig. Level 
Year 1 Excess bidder return -0.04858 *** 0.002204 ns 
Year 3 Excess bidder return -0.19475 *** -0.09447 ns 
Year 5 Excess bidder return -0.26498 *** -0.22495 ns 
Bootstrapped Skewness-adjusted t-statistics:  
Year 1 T-statistic -2.83449 *** 0.073951 ns 
Year 3 T-statistic -5.13689 *** -1.23991 ns 
Year 5 T-statistic -3.76408 *** -1.84514 * 
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Table 9: Bidder returns partitioned by hostility and form of financing. Figures show excess returns with pseudo-portfolio 
significance levels, followed by bootstrapped skewness adjusted t-statistic.  Significance levels are shown for the t-statistics and for the 
Lyon et al (1999) pseudo-portfolio sampling method. Significance levels are denoted by * (10%), **(5%), and ***(1%) using two-
tailed tests.  Two alternative matching procedures are presented: BTMS denotes book-to-market and sized matched excess returns, 
whilst size-matched denotes excess returns benchmarked against decile portfolios only.  Panel A presents the results partitioned by 
form of financing and bidder hostility when bidder returns are BTMS matched; Panel B presents the returns partitioned by form of 
financing and bidder hostility when returns are size-matched.     
Panel A: BTM and size-matched 
 Classification/no. obs in class 
Equity 
Non-
hostile 239 Equity Hostile 
 
70 
 
Cash Non-
hostile 
 
 
97 
 
Cash 
Hostile 
 
 
21 
Pseudo Portfolio Sampling results: 
Year Statistic Value 
Sig. 
Level Value 
Sig. 
Level Value 
Sig. 
Level Value 
Sig. 
Level 
Year 1 Excess bidder return -0.05948 *** -0.03291 ns -0.02287 ns 0.099468 ns 
Year 3 Excess bidder return -0.23732 *** -0.10484 ns -0.08473 ns 0.242982 ns 
Year 5 Excess bidder return -0.32903 *** -0.22361 ns -0.04011 ns 0.501299 * 
Bootstrapped Skewness-adjusted t-statistics: 
Year 1 T-statistic -2.7123 *** -0.63179 ns -0.63697 ns 1.397333 ns 
Year 3 T-statistic -5.42128 *** -1.26032 ns -1.07078 ns 1.247969 ns 
Year 5 T-statistic -4.05489 *** -1.77465 * -0.23534 ns 1.577418 ns 
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Panel B: Size-matched 
 Classification/no. obs in class 
Equity 
Non-
hostile 239 Equity Hostile 
 
70 
 
Cash Non-
hostile 
 
 
97 
 
Cash 
Hostile 
 
 
21 
Pseudo Portfolio Sampling results: 
Year Statistic Value 
Sig. 
Level Value 
Sig. 
Level Value 
Sig. 
Level Value 
Sig. 
Level 
Year 1 Excess bidder return -0.06506 ** -0.03697 ns -0.01896ns 0.088468ns 
Year 3 Excess bidder return -0.25742 *** -0.186 ns -0.0784ns 0.240093ns 
Year 5 Excess bidder return -0.37015 *** -0.34087 * -0.06485ns 0.494655ns 
Bootstrapped Skewness-adjusted t-statistics: 
Year 1 T-statistic -2.90639 *** -0.68279 ns -0.55294ns 1.294683ns 
Year 3 T-statistic -5.87395 *** -1.97757 * -1.05582ns 1.312384ns 
Year 5 T-statistic -4.55105 *** -2.41845 ** -0.41134ns 1.729451ns 
Table 10.Calendar Time Abnormal Returns.  Calendar time abnormal returns 
(CTARs) are calculated on the basis proposed in Mitchell and Stafford (2000) where 
portfolio abnormal returns are calculated relative to each security’s size-matched 
benchmark. 
 
Panel A: All months 
 Equity Cash 
Non-
hostile Hostile 
Mean CTAR -0.00429 -0.0026 -0.0049 -0.00088 
No. of 
Observations 272 267 272 269 
T-test -2.16602 -1.83361 -3.67188 -0.51091 
 
Panel B: High intensity months, defined as those months where the number of 
observations in any month is greater than the median number of observations 
 Equity Cash 
Non-
hostile Hostile 
Mean CTAR -0.00511 -0.00323 -0.00455 -0.00385 
No. of 
Observations 137 131 136 134 
T-test -3.854 -2.347 -3.424 -2.627 
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Table 11.Calendar Time Abnormal Returns: Form of financing and hostility 
subset results.  Calendar time abnormal returns (CTARs) are calculated on the basis 
proposed in Mitchell and Stafford (2000) where portfolio abnormal returns are 
calculated relative to each security’s size-matched benchmark. 
 
Panel A: All months 
 
Equity Non-
hostile 
Equity 
Hostile 
Cash Non-
hostile Cash Hostile 
Mean CTAR -0.00498 -0.00219 -0.00338 0.00203 
No. of 
Observations 272 242 267 261 
T-test -2.329 -1.314 -2.21409 0.867955 
 
Panel B: High intensity months, defined as those months where the number of 
observations in any month is greater than the median number of observations 
 
Equity Non-
hostile 
Equity 
Hostile 
Cash Non-
hostile Cash Hostile 
Mean CTAR -0.00548 -0.00426 -0.0035 -0.00026 
No. of 
Observations 136 130 134 122 
T-test -3.603 -2.571 -2.084 -0.088 
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Table 12. Negative binomial regressions of number of quarterly mergers on 
macro-economic indicators.  Dependent variables the number of quarterly 
acquisitions of differing types.  Independent variables are the lagged level of the long 
run government bond (“gilt”) yield to equity dividend yield ratio (GEYR), the previous 
quarter’s return on the market, over and above the risk free rate (LAGRMRF), the 
lagged level of the one-month Treasury bill yield (LAGTBR), and the lagged UK ten 
year Government Bond rate (LAGLONG). Figures in parentheses are the probability 
levels of the z-statistics of the coefficients in a two-tailed test. 
 
 ALL ALL EQUITY EQUITY CASH 
GEYR 1.285 1.667 1.683 2.187 0.448
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.33)
LAGRMRF -0.789 -1.307 -0.13 -0.96 -2.045
 (0.30) (0.06) (0.90) (0.30) (0.08)
LAGTBR -0.021  -0.028   
 (0.38)  (0.39)   
LAGLONG  -0.226  -0.319 -0.136
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.02)
CONSTANT -1.893 -0.575 -3.231 -1.306 -0.118
 (0.00) (0.32) (0.00) (0.09) (0.91)
Pseudo R2 0.026 0.08 0.035 0.103 0.018
 
